Prioritizing Invasive Species Threats Under Uncertainty by Moffitt, L. Joe & Osteen, Craig D.
Prioritizing Invasive Species Threats 
Under Uncertainty 
 
L. Joe Moffitt and Craig D. Osteen 
 
  Prioritizing exotic or invasive pest threats in terms of agricultural, environmental, or human 
health damages is an important resource allocation issue for programs charged with preventing 
or responding to the entry of such organisms. Under extreme uncertainty, program managers 
may decide to research the severity of threats, develop prevention or control actions, and 
estimate cost-effectiveness in order to provide better information and more options when 
making decisions to choose strategies for specific pests. We examine decision rules based on 
the minimax and relative cost criteria in order to express a cautious approach for decisions 
regarding severe, irreversible consequences, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these 
rules, examine the roles of simple rules and sophisticated analyses in decision making, and 
apply a simple rule to develop a list of priority plant pests. 
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The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
have programs to prevent or respond to the entry 
of damaging exotic pests or invasive species, 
which are non-native organisms that cause dam-
ages in excess of benefits. Program officials make 
important preparedness decisions concerning many 
organisms, such as whether or not to collect more 
information about specific organisms and their 
potential effects; implement surveillance programs; 
develop management practices or strategies; ban 
or restrict imports; require import inspections or 
treatments; implement offshore management pro-
grams; develop plans for eradication, contain-
ment, or control strategies in response to pest de-
tections; or implement information or extension 
programs to help growers identify and respond to 
a pest. Officials with constrained budgets may 
have to make rapid decisions under extreme un-
certainty. For these reasons, prioritizing invasive 
species threats and responses is an important re-
source allocation issue for government decision 
makers. 
  Different economic approaches can be applied 
to decisions concerning invasive species threats, 
ranging from sophisticated models that consider 
spatial, dynamic, stochastic, and other aspects of 
economic and biological systems, to simple deci-
sion rules using minimal information. Both so-
phisticated models and simple rules can have 
roles in decision making, depending on the deci-
sion to be made, available information, and time 
available for data collection and analysis. We 
develop a group of simple decision rules that use 
minimal information, discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of those rules, examine potential roles 
for different rules in decision making, and apply a 
simple rule to develop a list of priority plant pests 
for preparedness activities. 
  In developing the simplified decision rules, we 
use the minimax criterion as a way to express a 
cautious approach for decision making, which 
Horan et al. (2002) suggest decision makers use 
for uncertain invasive species events with poten-
tially severe, irreversible consequences. The rela-
tive cost criterion as applied in the economics of 
terrorism literature provides insight when there 
are severe uncertainties about the effectiveness of 
prevention and response options. Since govern-
ment officials sometimes use a cautious approach 
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for decision making under uncertainty, the eco-
nomic implications warrant examination. For ex-
ample, Michael Chertoff, Secretary of DHS, said 
that while the Department’s risk analysis is based 
on threat, vulnerability, and consequences, “DHS 
will concentrate first and most relentlessly on 
addressing threats that pose catastrophic conse-
quences” (Chertoff 2005). 
 
 
Context of the Decision Problem 
 
Prioritizing pests or invasive species generally 
focuses on identifying and ranking the worst 
threats. The National Invasive Species Council 
(2003) discussed guidelines for early detection 
and rapid response systems and cited the need for 
active detection networks to focus on high-prior-
ity species, pathways, and at-risk sites, and for 
preliminary risk assessment of high-priority spe-
cies before detection in order to facilitate rapid 
response after detection. USDA’s Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) annu-
ally prioritizes plant pests for the Cooperative 
Agricultural Pest Survey (CAPS) in order to allo-
cate detection and surveillance resources to the 
greatest threats, using criteria for potential entry, 
establishment, spread, economic impact, and non-
economic impact. Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-9 (HSPD-9), in 2004, directed USDA, 
in coordination with other agencies, to develop a 
National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS) 
in order to respond to high-consequence diseases 
of economically important crops by identifying 
pest control measures and developing emergency 
plans for their use. 
  From an ideal economic perspective, decision 
makers would consider the costs of prevention or 
management options and their effects on pest 
damages, simultaneously select the best approach 
for every pest, and allocate funds to pests and 
actions, subject to a budget constraint. However, 
decision makers often face extreme uncertainty, 
that is, sparse or unreliable information, about 
new pests, some of which may be imminent 
threats, and/or response options. There may be 
incomplete information about what crops a pest 
might damage, potential for entry, potential dam-
age, crop area at risk, rates of increase and 
spread, and environmental and economic factors 
affecting entry, spread, and damage. In the most 
extreme cases, the identity of an organism as a 
pest may be uncertain, because there are undis-
covered organisms that may become pests in new 
environments, while some known organisms, 
benign in their native environments because natu-
ral enemies or production practices mitigate in-
festations or damage, may cause significant dam-
age in new environments. There also may be in-
complete information about the cost-effectiveness 
of preventative or management methods for some 
pest threats, and in some cases, those options may 
be poorly understood or not available. Uncer-
tainty about the likelihood and economic conse-
quences of pest events hinders accurate assess-
ment of threats, while uncertainty about the cost-
effectiveness of prevention or management options 
hinders selection of a strategy. When detection or 
control methods are not available or are poorly 
understood, none can be selected. 
  Due to the time and costs of collecting informa-
tion and analyzing pest threats and response op-
tions, agencies often respond to the threats as 
information becomes available to prevent major 
crop damage or loss of export markets. So, pro-
gram managers might make a series of decisions. 
The sequential decision making process has 
characteristics of dual control or active learning 
where decisions are made to gain information 
(Kendrick 2005). Program managers may respond 
to new, passively or actively obtained information 
about exotic pest threats with active learning in 
order to reduce uncertainty about pest threats or 
to develop control or other preparedness methods, 
and later use that information to select appropri-
ate methods for each pest, rather than simultane-
ously determining optimal strategies for all pests. 
For example, USDA agencies, such as the Agri-
cultural Research Service and the Cooperative 
State Research, Education, and Extension Ser-
vice, have programs to study new pest threats, de-
velop control or preparedness methods, or dis-
seminate information, which can be used by other 
decision makers. If control or preparedness meth-
ods are unknown or poorly understood, decision 
makers have no choice but to follow such a deci-
sion making process. Different decision rules can 
prioritize learning, preventative, or other response 
actions, depending on available information. 
  In some circumstances, decision makers might 
respond with provisional prevention or prepara-
tion measures, as well as active learning, when 







new, sparse information indicates that an exotic 
pest threat is highly damaging, irreversible, and 
imminent. The active learning could better quan-
tify the threat or develop methods to detect or 
manage the pest, but could also indicate whether 
the measures should be continued, modified, or 
terminated to prevent misallocation of resources 
and complaints from other nations that the meas-
ures do not meet the standards of the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (World Trade Organization 1994). 
 
 
Approaches to Managing Invasive Species 
Under Uncertainty 
 
Primary differences in modeling efficient man-
agement of invasive species relate to the repre-
sentation of uncertainty about the likelihood and 
economic consequences of events and the effects 
of preventative or management actions. The eco-
nomic framework for risk management (risk 
management approach) is often used to address 
uncertainty in decisions. Shogren (2000) devel-
oped an optimal control model for reducing risks 
from invasive species while allocating scarce re-
sources across market and non-market goods for 
the overall benefit of society. The model charac-
terizes uncertainty through probabilities, a tradi-
tional approach that treats uncertainty as essen-
tially the same as risk, and accounts for the effect 
of decisions and actions on probabilities. Risks 
can be reduced by mitigation (reducing the odds 
of a bad event) and adaptation (reducing the con-
sequences of a bad event). Shogren’s model is 
expressed as follows: 
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where EU is expected social welfare of the man-
ager’s nation, x is the manager’s investment in 
adaptation (assumed to be a private good—exclu-
sive and rival in consumption), Q is the man-
ager’s investment in mitigation (assumed to be a 
public good—non-exclusive and non-rival in 
consumption), p(Q; θ) is the probability of a good 
event, V0[m – c(x, Q)] is social welfare given a 
good event, m is endowed wealth, c(x, Q) is the 
cost function for adaptation and mitigation activi-
ties, [1–p(Q; θ)] is the probability of a bad event, 
V1[m–D (x; θ) – c (x, Q)] is social welfare given 
a bad event, D(x;θ) is the money equivalent of 
damages if a bad event happens, θ is a random 
variable which takes values in the interval [a,b] 
according to cumulative distribution function F(θ;β) 
and represents basic scientific uncertainty about 
the impact of an invasive species, and β is exoge-
nous collective investments in research to reduce 
the uncertainty about the impact of an invasive 
species. 
  Eiswerth and van Kooten (2002) developed a 
firm-level, stochastic dynamic programming model 
for control of invasive weeds that recognizes 
several sources of uncertainty by using fuzzy sets, 
including lack of data, measurement error, vari-
ability in rate of spread, and impact of man-
agement measures, as well as the need to use 
categorical descriptions of uncertain events. 
  Horan et al. (2002) question the appropriate-
ness of probabilities for representing uncertainty 
in the case of invasive species, suggesting that 
expected utility calculations, used in the risk 
management or Bayesian frameworks, may have 
limited value for analysis of some invasive spe-
cies problems, and they identify these reasons: (i) 
the frequency of invasive species introductions 
may depend on trade levels and may be low, (ii) 
probabilities are difficult to assign to one-time 
events with no historical precedent, such as some 
invasive species introductions, and (iii) invasive 
species events may be very costly and irreversi-
ble. They developed a model of decision making 
under ignorance—where neither subjective 
probabilities nor detailed knowledge of the event 
space is available—based on Katzner (1998), 
Shackle (1969), and Vickers (1987). Their model 
features the notion of potential surprise, a meas-
ure of disbelief of potential future outcomes, and 
recognizes that inconceivable outcomes may oc-
cur. Decision makers would not focus on all out-
comes and expected utilities, but rather on “the 
least unbelievable conjectured losses or gains 
from the activity,” or “focus loss,” without neces-
sarily accounting for a probability distribution. 
However, catastrophic events with high potential 
surprise would not factor into the focus loss. Un-
der this behavioral model, decision makers would 
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take a cautious approach when considering uncer-
tain outcomes so that low probability outcomes 
that are considered possible—those with low po-
tential surprise—receive more prevention resources 
than under a risk management approach. 
  In addition to the concerns raised by Horan et 
al. (2002), a serious practical limitation of risk-
based models is that it may be difficult or impos-
sible to estimate or interpret probabilities and the 
novel circumstances that surround the introduc-
tion and establishment of potential invasive spe-
cies, particularly those that have not yet entered 
or those that are poorly understood. Ouchi (2004) 
argued that there is no formally established meth-
odology for treating expert judgment and that 
Bayesian and other approaches suffer from limi-
tations in practical application. Even in cases 
where a historical record may suggest likelihoods, 
the prospect of intentional introductions or related 
challenges to biosecurity may render historical 
records largely unusable. Accounting for the ef-
fects of human activity on new pest entry and the 
susceptibility of agro-ecosystems to pests, as well 
as the endogenous effect of mitigation and adap-
tation activities on probabilities characterized in 




Developing Criteria for Decision Making 
Under Uncertainty 
 
When probabilities of events are not reliably 
measured or are not appropriate for representing 
uncertainty, as discussed above, traditional crite-
ria for decision making under uncertainty include 
the maximin and maximax criteria, which repre-
sent polar extremes of optimism and pessimism, 
and the Laplace and Hurwitz criteria, which re-
quire information similar to probabilities (Render, 
Stair, and Hanna 2006). Info-gap methods are also 
applicable (Ben-Haim 2006). We selected the 
minimax criterion to represent a cautious approach 
to decision making regarding the adverse effects 
of invasive species and responses to those species 
when probabilities of events are unknown or are 
inappropriate for representing uncertainty, but 
other criteria could be used with different results. 
The following discussion shows how decision 
rules using that criterion follow from the tradi-
tional risk model through simplifying assump-
tions and economic logic when probability esti-
mates and other important information, such as 
the cost-effectiveness of management options, are 
not available. As information becomes scarcer, 
decision making changes from selecting optimal 
actions to prioritizing pests. 
  Uncertainty criteria are often depicted in the 
context of decision analysis. The risk model, as 
represented in Shogren (2000), can be interpreted 
in a decision analysis framework by characteriz-
ing the choice set as a finite number of alterna-
tives and basic scientific uncertainty as a discrete 
random variable. [A decision table based on 
Shogren’s model is shown in Moffitt and Osteen 
(2004).] The choice set contains J possible pairs 
of investments in adaptation and mitigation, 
((x1,Q1), (x2,Q2), · · ·, (xJ,QJ)). The basic scien-
tific uncertainty concerning establishment of an 
introduced species, θ, is represented by a discrete 
random variable that takes on K different values 
denoted by θ1, θ2, · · ·, θK, with the probability of 
the  kth value denoted by p(θk). The optimal 
solution is the adaptation and mitigation pair cor-
responding to the largest EU. To develop a rank-
ing of potential invaders for budgetary purposes, 
equation (1) would be solved to find the optimal 
action or program, (x,Q), for each potential in-
vader, and the ranking would be based on the 
relative welfare improvements due to the optimal 
actions as compared to doing little or nothing, 
(0,0). Due to large information requirements, ex-
pression (1) may be very difficult to apply to 
many potential invaders, but it provides a foun-
dation for modeling preparedness under uncer-
tainty for invasive species. 
  The traditional model can be further simplified 
by assuming constant marginal social welfare and 
minimizing expected social cost (EC), measured 
as the sum of expenditures for preparedness ac-
tions and expected damage, which is a standard 
approach for pest control decision making: 
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Economic priorities associated with invasive spe-
cies and the selection of adaptation and mitigation 
options could be ascertained by solving (2) for 
each possible invader. Priority rankings for budg-







ets would be based on the reduction in EC for 
each pest due to the optimal choice of (x,  Q) 
relative to doing little or nothing, (0, 0). The 
greater the reduction in EC, the higher prepared-
ness action for a pest would rank. The informa-
tion requirements associated with (2) are still sig-
nificant, making it difficult to apply to many po-
tential invaders. 
  If probabilities of events are not available, can-
not be estimated, or are not appropriate for repre-
senting uncertainty, the decision considers only 
one θk at a time. In this framework, c(xi, Qi) is in-
terpreted as the cost of an action or program. 
Many actions or programs have aspects of both 
mitigation and adaptation. For example, eradica-
tion or containment can reduce damages at one 
location and prevent or slow the spread of dam-
age to another. Effective prevention programs have 
a mitigating effect, but they prevent damages 
even if the probabilities of damages are unknown. 
For example, if a practice, such as methyl bro-
mide fumigation or irradiation, is known to con-
trol a pest, treating potentially infested imports 
would prevent damages even if the probability of 
pest entry is unknown. 
  The minimax cost criterion selects the action 
(xi,  Qi) that minimizes pest damage plus cost, 
given the value of θk that results in the worst pest 
damage and use of the action: 
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If estimates of the costs of preventative and con-
trol actions and their effects on worst-case dam-
ages were available, then the minimax cost crite-
rion would identify optimal actions for the worst 
state of nature. This criterion can consider multi-
ple factors affecting damage under one state of 
nature and could be applied to obtain actions un-
der other θk’s, but outcomes would not be 
weighted by probabilities. Economic priority 
rankings for invasive species would be based on 
the reduction in worst-case damages plus costs 
for the optimal program as compared to doing 
nothing for each potential invader—the greater 
the reduction, the higher the ranking of prepared-
ness for a species. The priorities would rank opti-
mal actions for pests and also rank pests for more 
information about damage and states of nature. 
  Unfortunately, for many invasive species threats, 
information needed to apply the minimax crite-
rion, as expressed in (3), may not be available. 
Program managers may face situations where 
there are few or no known preventative or control 
actions available or where there is little or no 
information about the effect of actions on pest 
damage. In these cases, selecting prevention and 
control actions for species becomes problematic. 
As a result, initial preparedness decisions will often 
focus on collecting information about pest threats 
and on the availability, cost, and effectiveness of 
prevention or control actions, in order to later 
facilitate the selection of actions. 
  The relative cost criterion, which is implicit in 
some economics of terrorism literature and based 
on the difference between damage estimates and 
action costs, could be combined with the minimax 
criterion to cope with this uncertainty. Some is-
sues faced in the context of terrorism are re-
markably similar to issues in crop protection (e.g., 
Cauley and Im 1988, Enders and Sandler 1993, 
Enders and Sandler 1996, Lapan and Sandler 
1993, Lee 1988, Schwartz 1998, Slone 2000). A 
critical question is the prioritization of defense of 
potential targets, as well as prioritization of re-
sources between preemptive and defensive meas-
ures (Endress 2002). For example, a comparison 
of damages resulting from a successful terrorist 
attack with the costs to terrorists of mounting an 
attack has led some economists to conclude that 
the marginal product of destructive activity greatly 
exceeds the marginal product of defense. In other 
words, potential damages to a target are thought 
to be large, and defensive measures are not ex-
pected to prevent all successful attacks. There-
fore, some economists have concluded that re-
sources should be directed at terrorist resources in 
a preemptive rather than a defensive effort (Mad-
rick 2002). In such analyses, the likelihood that 
preemptive or defensive actions will prevent de-
structive activity is difficult to quantify, though 
the cost of the actions can be more easily deter-
mined. 
  The key consideration of the relative cost crite-
rion is that selection of an action can be based on 
the magnitude of estimated damages associated 
with doing little or nothing relative to the cost of 
the action. When important elements such as the 







likelihood of consequences and the effectiveness 
of the action are highly uncertain, a decision 
maker using the reasoning of the relative cost 
criterion will select the action for which the dif-
ference between estimated damages and costs of 
action is the greatest. Moreover, if estimated 
damages utilized in the relative cost calculation 
reflect a worst-case scenario, then the minimax 
and relative cost criteria have been combined. 
  The principle underlying the combination of 
the minimax and relative cost criteria follows: 
under extreme uncertainty, if the damages under 
the worst-case scenario associated with doing 
little or nothing are large relative to program cost, 
then the program may be worthwhile even though 
the probabilities of outcomes and program effec-
tiveness are largely unknown. Expression (4) 
combines the minimax and relative cost criteria: 
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The criteria expressed in (4) can be used to estab-
lish economic priorities for potential invaders by 
maximizing the difference between worst-case 
potential damages associated with doing nothing 
and the costs of known preparedness actions for 
an invader (other than doing nothing). In this 
case, the decision maker does not have an esti-
mate of damage reduction due to (xi,Qi) but has 
reason to believe that the action may be effective. 
Potential damages would be measured by presum-
ing that the most deleterious state of nature and θk 
causing the worst damage prevail. Based on the 
minimax/relative cost criteria, the greater that po-
tential damage from an invader is relative to the 
action’s cost, the higher would be its economic 
priority for preparedness, even though expected 
gain from the action cannot be determined. 
  The difference between the worst-case damage 
and cost of action is a measure of the maximum 
potential return resulting from the action or the 
maximum cost that can be incurred, including re-
search, control, or other expenses. Actions for 
which the cost is greater than worst-case damage 
would not be feasible, but actions that pass this 
feasibility test might still be cost-ineffective. So, 
the priorities rank pests for research to measure 
the cost and effectiveness of actions and to assess 
new, poorly understood alternatives that are 
cheaper or more effective than a costly, well-un-
derstood one. 
  If no effective control actions are known or no 
cost-effectiveness information is available, the 
ranking using expression (4) would be based en-
tirely on the estimate of maximum potential dam-
age, which indicates a maximum potential return 
if a control were to become available. This spe-
cial case of expression (4) is used subsequently 
for the empirical application in this paper. In this 
case, only pest threats can be prioritized; optimal 
preventative or control actions cannot be selected. 
Priorities rank pests for research to better under-
stand pest damages and probabilities and to de-
velop prevention, detection, or management actions 
before such actions can be selected. Scientists 
have used similar approaches to characterize pest 
risk. For example, Kolar and Lodge (2002) classi-
fied the worst exotic fish threats as “nuisance” (a 
measure of impact) with a “fast” rate of spread, 
without estimating probabilities of outcomes (p. 
1235), which is similar to ranking pests by worst 
potential damage, except that threats were meas-
ured in non-monetary terms and not differentiated 
within a category. 
 
 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Implications for 
the Decision Making Process 
 
The minimax criterion, which is included in (3) 
and (4), differs from the risk management ap-
proach by not explicitly addressing the likeli-
hoods of damaging events. In addition, the com-
bination of the minimax and relative cost criteria 
in (4) does not address rates of growth and spread 
or factors that limit area infested. The minimax 
and relative cost criteria and risk management 
approach identify similar rankings of threats and 
preparedness investments if (i) proportional pest 
damage estimates are the same or the rank-order 
of damages is the same for both approaches, (ii) 
pests can infest a high percentage of crop area, 
and (iii) rates of spread to full infestation are 
rapid. So, assuming agreement on the magnitude 
of proportional consequences, the minimax/rela-
tive cost criteria and the risk management ap-
proach would identify the same worst threats, 
where highly damaging pests rapidly infest high 
percentages of crop area. Inaccurate damage esti-
mates, based on sparse or unreliable information 
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or obtained from inconsistent sources, could result 
in inaccurate rankings of pest threats under both 
the risk management approach and minimax/rela-
tive cost criteria. Unknown pests or pests for 
which potential damages are poorly understood 
are difficult to prioritize, even though they ulti-
mately could have large impacts. Similarly, both 
approaches can result in inaccurate ranking of 
prevention or control actions if cost-effectiveness 
estimates are inaccurate, and will obviously be 
unable to select prevention or control actions if 
none are available. The minimax loss criterion 
has been criticized for assuming that people can-
not formulate subjective probabilities. Under sub-
jective expected utility theory, it is assumed that 
people will use subjective probabilities when the 
probabilities are not objectively known (Savage 
1954, Camerer and Weber 1992). However, while 
some individuals may quickly develop subjective 
probabilities, other literature indicates that some 
individuals do not quickly develop them and make 
decisions as if averse to ambiguity or uncertainty, 
which is different than risk aversion (Ellsberg 
1961, Hsu et al. 2005, Rustichini et al. 2005). 
  The risk management approach will allocate 
resources more efficiently than the minimax and 
relative cost criteria will, if reliable probability 
and impact estimates are available. Due to the 
implicit assumptions and sparse information 
about important parameters, the minimax and 
relative cost criteria could lead to misallocations 
of resources to threats or actions. The criteria, as 
expressed in (3) and (4), may give too high a pri-
ority to less serious threats by not accounting for 
factors that reduce the likelihood or magnitude of 
damage. If only a small portion of crop area 
would be affected, the rate of spread were slow, 
or potential for entry or spread were low, the cri-
teria would overestimate potential loss, identify a 
higher priority, and lead to more preparedness 
measures than the risk management approach 
would. Also, expression (4) would overestimate 
the potential return to control measures if avail-
able information underestimates their cost. In 
addition, the minimax criterion does not consider 
all states of nature and their probabilities, focus-
ing on the worst state, so it is difficult to compare, 
for resource allocation purposes, uncertain threats 
to pests currently causing damages. 
  The simple minimax/relative cost approach may 
have an advantage over risk management based 
evaluations if decisions must be made quickly 
and if it is costly or difficult to obtain reliable 
probability estimates for entry or spread. In this 
circumstance, decision makers exercising caution 
regarding severe pest threats would prioritize—
for costly research and development activities—
threats with larger and potentially irreversible 
consequences higher than threats with potentially 
smaller consequences that might be more likely. 
While the risk management approach would allo-
cate resources more efficiently than the mini-
max/relative cost criteria would if reliable prob-
ability and impact estimates were available, the 
time and cost requirements for satisfying the large 
information needs of the risk management ap-
proach, especially for sophisticated analyses using 
bioeconomic or stochastic dynamic control models, 
could be greater than those of the minimax/rela-
tive cost criteria, which can be more quickly esti-
mated, due to smaller information requirements, 
and easily revised with new information. 
  The strengths and weaknesses of the minimax 
and relative cost criteria help define roles for dif-
ferent rules in the sequential decision making 
process discussed earlier. Simple economics-
based decision rules can identify the worst pest 
threats, assuming that potential damage estimates 
are accurate, but there is a need for more informa-
tion to separate the overrated threats from the 
worst threats and ultimately to select responses 
for specific pests. So, if simple rules are used, the 
decision making process should include the fol-
lowing steps in order to address the effects of 
inaccurate estimates or limited information: (i) 
collect important missing information to reduce 
uncertainty, (ii) reexamine threats and priorities 
based on new information, which may indicate 
more information needs, and (iii) select preven-
tion and/or management strategies for high-prior-
ity pests, which may involve more sophisticated 
economic analyses, using information collected 
for those threats. These steps provide an opportu-
nity to modify pest rankings and allocation of re-
sources to research and development, and to 
evaluate the costs, effectiveness, and irreversible, 
adverse consequences of new preparedness or 
response alternatives, before the final selection of 
actions. 
  In effect, simple decision rules would prioritize 
pests for assessment of the likelihood and mag-
nitude of threats, development of pest detection 
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and management options, research on the costs 
and consequences of those options, or analyses to 
select such options, all of which are costly and 
subject to limited budgets. For example, the 
minimax criterion indicates that, if rapid response 
panels were organized to assess the subjective 
probabilities of the consequences of pest events 
and responses, pests with potentially large ad-
verse consequences would have a higher priority 
for inclusion in the set of pests for assessment, 
even if the unknown probability of events might 
be small, than would pests with smaller but po-
tentially more likely consequences. More sophis-
ticated analyses using models that account for 
bioeconomic systems, time, space, or risk, and 
that have large data requirements, can be focused 
on high-priority threats in order to highlight deci-
sion trade-offs and help select actions. 
  Research on high-priority threats would also 
provide information to (i) re-estimate pest dam-
age and reprioritize pest threats, which could 
identify other needs for research, (ii) examine the 
costs, effectiveness, and potential adverse effects 
of responses, and (iii) conduct more sophisticated 
analyses to select options. In the third case, when 
probabilities are appropriate for representing un-
certainty of events and good estimates become 
available through the learning process, the tradi-
tional risk management approach, as expressed by 
equations (1) or (2), could be used to evaluate de-
cisions. If probabilities are not available or appro-
priate for representing uncertainty but other rele-
vant information is available, then the minimax 
criterion in expression (3) or other uncertainty 
criteria could be used to select actions. 
 
Crop Protection Priorities 
 
We developed a ranking of potential agricultural 
crop pests not currently or previously in the 
United States to demonstrate use of the combined 
minimax and relative cost criteria, as expressed 
in (4). A pessimistic presumption consistent with 
this approach is that significant pest problems in 
foreign locales will eventually lead to a similar 
significant domestic pest experience. While this 
presumption might not always be true, some em-
pirical evidence supports using it. Reichard and 
Hamilton (1997) found that the most reliable 
characteristic for predicting invasiveness of woody 
plants was whether or not the species was known 
to invade elsewhere in the world. We assumed 
that no cost-effective options are available, so 
pests were ranked by worst-case damage esti-
mates. A list developed with these procedures 
could be regarded as a first step in the decision 
making process, because it prioritizes pests for 
actions that obtain information about damage se-
verity or the availability, cost, and effectiveness 
of exclusion or management actions in order to 
inform decisions that select such actions. 
  The procedure identified arthropod, weed, and 
disease pests that have never been in the United 
States but that could affect any of the 25 highest-
value U.S. crops. Focusing the analysis on high-
value crops assumes that prevention or manage-
ment costs will be low relative to damage costs, 
which provides a rationale for preparedness ac-
tions. The procedure derived the 25 highest-value 
U.S. crops for a representative year, identified 
foreign countries where the crops are also pro-
duced, identified pests affecting the crops in the 
foreign countries, and recorded reported estimates 
of pest damage to the crops. 
  The list of the 25 highest-value crops produced 
in the United States for a representative year was 
derived by averaging published government sta-
tistics of crop values for 2001 and 2002 (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 2003). A detailed 
search of international crop production records 
reported by the Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (United Nations 2002) 
as well as reports found on the Internet related to 
crop production identified countries where any 
amount of the listed 25 crops is produced. Pro-
duction amounts are small in some of the areas, 
but this illustrates that not just major production 
regions but all production areas were considered 
as potential sources of pests. 
  A large number of sources were examined to 
identify pest species and obtain damage estimates 
for each of the listed crops in each country where 
some production is reported. Then, a search was 
conducted to determine which foreign pest spe-
cies are not currently or were not previously in 
the United States. Information sources included 
newspaper articles, trade journals, and some 
agency reports. However, online resources on the 
Internet proved to be the most valuable informa-
tion source for both the identity and seriousness 
of pests in foreign countries. More than 22,000 
Internet sites were examined. The exhaustive 
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search effort yielded significant information in 
some cases and little in others. To maintain con-
sistency with a minimax perspective, it was as-
sumed that all the U.S. acreage of a crop would 
be affected at the maximum pest yield loss per-
centage for foreign locales. In cases where infor-
mation was inadequate to estimate damage, pest 
species were not prioritized. Over 50 pest species 
were identified and analyzed, but additional pests 
could be examined. The list of the 25 most 
valuable crops in the United States is provided in 
a footnote to Table 1, while the underlying crop 
value statistics, countries reporting production, 
and potential invasive species for each of the 25 
most valuable crops are shown in Moffitt and 
Osteen (2004). 
  Our priority list is comprised of five arthropod, 
two weed, and three disease pests, ranked by po-
tential impact (Table 1). It is unclear if these are 
the worst threats facing U.S. agricultural crops, 
but they may warrant further attention. It could 
turn out that a damaging pest in a foreign locale 
cannot survive in the United States and that pre-
paredness is not warranted. Alternatively, exotic 
pest damage in a new environment could be 
worse than in the native one. 
  Included in this priority list are three plant 
pathogens on USDA’s list of biological agents 
with the potential to pose severe threats to plant 
health or plant products (Table 2): two strains of 
citrus greening disease (Lieberobacter africanum, 
Lieberobacter asiaticum) and Asian soybean rust 
(Phakopsora pachyrhizi). Two other pathogens 
on the USDA list of biological agents—citrus 
variegated chlorisis strain of Xylella fastidiosa 
and southern bacterial wilt (Ralstonia solanacea-
rum)—were identified in developing Table 1 but 
not ranked in the top ten. Agents on the USDA 
list are subject to regulation of transfer under the 
Agricultural Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and are 
also priorities for the USDA’s National Plant 
Disease Recovery System. USDA considered 
three criteria in identifying the selected agents: (i) 
effect on plant health or products, (ii) virulence of 
the pathogen (or toxicity of toxin) and the meth-
ods of transfer to plants, and (iii) availability of 
methods to treat or prevent disease caused by the 
agent. Plant pathogens that satisfy the criteria for 
selected agents will also rank high under the 
minimax/relative cost approach, which relies on 
potential damage estimates and is similar to the 
first of the USDA criteria. Differences, apart from 
any associated with decision criteria, follow from 
Table 1’s exclusion of pests that have been or are 
now in the United States, and Table 2’s inclusion 




Government decision makers sometimes must 
respond to pest threats in situations where there is 
limited information. Under extreme uncertainty, 
they may choose to conduct research to clarify the 
likelihood and severity of pest threats, develop 
prevention or control actions, and estimate their 
cost-effectiveness to inform later decisions about 
control strategies for specific pests. 
  Simple decision rules have a role in decision 
making about pest threats, as do risk assessments 
and sophisticated economic analyses. Sophisti-
cated analyses are appropriate if reliable informa-
tion is available, but simple rules may have a role 
when information is scarce and decisions must be 
made quickly. We used the minimax and relative 
cost criteria to develop simple decision rules 
based on the notion that decision makers might 
choose to exercise caution regarding the worst 
pest threats. We screened a number of exotic crop 
pest threats and applied this approach to develop 
a priority list. Other simple decision rules or 
measures of pest threat could be used, resulting in 
different rankings of threats and options. Our 
discussion is part of a work in progress, which we 
are extending by applying more general concepts 
developed by Ben-Haim (2006) to examine the 
robustness of decisions or the reliability of 
acceptable outcomes under extreme uncertainty 
and the trade-offs between robustness and per-
formance measures. An advantage of the Ben-
Haim approach over the minimax and similar 
criteria is that it can consider uncertainty about 
multiple states of nature and risk as an uncertain 
parameter. 
  While the minimax criterion, like other simple 
rules, can be relatively cheap and used quickly, it 
does not account for all outcomes and could mis-
allocate resources. A recognition of the criterion’s 
weaknesses implies that steps should be included 
in the decision making process to avoid or correct 
errors in identifying the worst threats or threats 
that are too costly to control. Simple decision rules 
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Table 1. Prioritization of Invasive Species by the Minimax/Relative Cost Criteria
a 
Pest  Crop  Worst-case cost ($ billions) 
Larger grain borer (Prostephanus truncatus) corn    17.6 
Soybean rust (Phakopsora pachyrhizi)
b soybean    11.8 
Phormium yellow leaf (Phytophthora clandestina) hay/strawberry    9.4 
Sunpest (Eurygaster integriceps) wheat    5.8 
Cleaver (Galium aparine) wheat    3.5 
Guatemalan moth (Tecia solanivora) potato    2.9 
Black – grass (Alopecurus myosuroides) wheat    2.8 
Andean potato weevil (Premnotrypes spp) potato    1.7 
Greening disease (Lieberobacter africanum; L. asiaticum) orange    1.7 
European wasp (Vespula germanica) grape    1.7 
a This list was developed by identifying exotic pests not currently or previously in the United States and estimating potential 
damages for the 25 highest U.S. value crops, averaged over 2001 and 2002: almonds, apples, barley, broccoli, carrots, corn, 
cotton, cottonseed, dry edible beans, grapes, hay, lettuce, mushrooms, onions, oranges, peaches, peanuts, potatoes, rice, sorghum, 
soybeans, strawberries, tobacco, tomatoes, and wheat. 
b Soybean rust was discovered in the United States during November 2004 after this list was constructed. 
 
can prioritize pest organisms for the collection of 
relevant information, including risk assessments 
and sophisticated economic analyses, to modify 
priorities and better inform decisions. Priorities 
would need to be reassessed as new information 
about pest threats becomes available. The advan-
tage of such rules is that they can assist in the 
allocation of resources to the worst threats before 
it is too late or costly to address them. 
 









Ralstonia solanacearum, race 3, biovar 2 
Sclerophthora rayssiae var. zeae 
Synchytrium endobioticum 
Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzicola 
Xylella fastidiosa citrus variegated chlorosis strain 
a Both pathogens have entered the United States, and APHIS 
removed them from the select agent list on March 18, 2005. 
Phakospsora pachyrhizi was removed to facilitate research to 
manage Asian soybean rust. Plum pox was removed because it 
would not spread easily by natural means and would be diffi-
cult to spread intentionally. 
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